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I. INTRODUCTION 
In June 2016, an employee of a restaurant called Pizza Studio in 
Kansas City, Kansas, asked why she was earning twenty-five cents less 
than her friend, a male coworker.1  Seventeen-year-old Jensen Walcott 
discussed her $8 per hour salary with Jake Reed, also seventeen, who 
earned $8.25 per hour but had the same responsibilities and experience 
level as Walcott.2  Walcott spoke with a manager, who fired her and cited 
a company policy prohibiting wage discussions as the rationale.3  Though 
the restaurant eventually fired the manager and apologized, Walcott’s 
story caught the eye of local and national media.4  She and Reed became 
the focus of policy arguments during the 2016 presidential election.5 
As Walcott’s story gained national attention, it cast Kansas’s current 
pay equity statute into stark relief.  The law, in existence for 39 years,6 
has fallen behind the trend of other states’ legislation that is developing a 
different approach to pay equity laws nationwide.  Subsequently, the pay 
gap between men and women in Kansas has persisted.7  The state’s 
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 1.  Lisa Gutierrez, Teen’s Wage Disparity at KCK Pizza Shop Fires up Equal-Pay Debate — 
and Hillary Clinton, THE KANSAS CITY STAR (June 27, 2016, 1:15 PM), 
http://www.kansascity.com/news/local/article86226237.html. 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id.  See also Seth Stevenson, How to Write a Convention Speech for Two Anxious 
Teenagers, SLATE (July 28, 2016, 3:32 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2016/07/how_the_dnc_wrote_the_speech_f
or_jensen_walcott_and_jake_reed.html. 
 5.  Gutierrez, supra note 1. 
 6.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1205 (West 2000). 
 7.  National Partnership for Women & Families, Kansas Women and the Wage Gap (Apr. 
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continuing wage disparity is a microcosm of the national pay inequity 
problem.8  Although iterations of federal pay equity laws have been in 
place for more than 70 years, women over age 35 still only earn between 
76% and 81% of wages men earn, and even within the demographic with 
the smallest wage disparities—workers under the age of 35—women still 
earned 8% to 10% less than men do. 9  This data, paired with Walcott’s 
experience, provides an apt prologue to the central thesis developed in 
this Comment: To make substantial efforts to close its wage gap, 
Kansas—and other states facing similar wage disparity problems—
should follow models set out by three states that have strengthened 
provisions in their pay equity statutes.  These provisions address 
employer justifications for wage discrepancies and anti-retaliation 
measures, as well as expand the bases on which employees can file wage 
discrimination claims. 
These three states—California, Massachusetts, and New York—
passed legislation that aims to strengthen protections for workers and 
gives teeth to employee wage discrimination suits.10  These states’ 
approaches to closing the wage gap serve as models from which Kansas 
and other states can draw language and provisions to address their 
longstanding pay equity problems.  For example, these statutes raise the 
bar employers must meet when providing explanations for wage 
discrepancies between female and male employees that are not based on 
sex.11  The laws include protections for employees who want to discuss 
their wages with one another and with their employers.12  The statutes 
also broaden the geographic scope employees can use to compare 
themselves to others to demonstrate wage disparities.13  Kansas’s statute 
falls far short of California, Massachusetts, and New York’s pay equity 
provisions.  The Kansas law does not include analogous provisions about 
wage discussions or retaliation, and the scope of comparisons employees 
can make when filing suit are narrower.14 
                                                          
2016), http://www.nationalpartnership.org/research-library/workplace-fairness/fair-pay/4-2016-ks-
wage-gap.pdf (noting that Kansas women earn on average 77 cents for every dollar Kansas men 
earn). 
 8.  U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Highlights of Women’s Earnings in 2014,  BLS REPORTS 2 
(Nov. 2015), http://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/womens-earnings/archive/highlights-of-womens-
earnings-in-2014.pdf’. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  See infra Part II.B.3. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  See infra Part II.B.2. 
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There is an overarching social justice argument in favor of 
strengthening Kansas’s pay equity statute: employers should not 
compensate women and men engaged in comparable work differently.  
Regardless, states and businesses have taken issue with the economic 
impact that expanded pay equity laws may have.15  These concerns 
necessitate an economic approach to advocating for stronger pay equity 
laws that supports the social justice argument. 
This Comment argues that Kansas should incorporate select 
provisions from federal statutes and proposed legislation as well as from 
California, Massachusetts, and New York’s laws.  Such adoptions would 
have positive economic consequences for not only Kansas women, but 
also for the state as a whole.  Part II provides a primer on current federal 
and state pay equity statutes and focuses on comparisons and 
shortcomings among California, Massachusetts, and New York’s new 
statutes.  This section also compares Kansas’s current pay equity law to 
the three aforementioned updated statutes.  Part III aims to accomplish 
two tasks to make the argument that Kansas would economically benefit 
from adopting a combination of strengthened pay equity statutory 
provisions.  First, this section outlines the economic context and positive 
economic contributions such provisions would make in Kansas.  Second, 
this section explains the specific provisions Kansas should adopt and the 
impact such changes will have on empowering employees to seek pay 
equity and addressing economic policy concerns arising from the 
persistent wage gap. 
II. DEVELOPMENT AND LIMITATIONS OF CURRENT LAW 
While federal and state pay equity laws date back to the mid-20th 
century, they have provided insufficient protection for workers, primarily 
women, who continue to face broad wage inequality.  The Fair Labor 
Standards Act, which “establishe[d] minimum wage, overtime pay, 
recordkeeping[,] and child labor standards,”16 set the stage for the next 
                                                          
 15.  See, e.g., Samantha Marcus, Christie Vetoes N.J. Equal Pay Bill, NJ.COM 
http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2016/05/christie_announces_partial_veto_of_equal_ 
pay_bill.html (last updated May 4, 2016, 2:44 AM) (noting that Governor Christie vetoed the state’s 
pay equity bill in part because he found it to be “business unfriendly”); Diana Furchtgott-Roth, The 
Pay-Equity Police Get New Ammunition, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 11, 2016, 7:15 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-pay-equity-police-get-new-ammunition-1460416530 (arguing that 
strengthened pay equity statutes would result in heightened business costs). 
 16.  Rosa Cho & Abagail Kramer, Everything You Need to Know About the Equal Pay Act, 
INT’L CENTER FOR RES. ON WOMEN 3, https://www.icrw.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/11/Everything-You-Need-to-Know-about-the-Equal-Pay-Act.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 27, 2017). 
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half-century’s legislation governing the wage gap between men and 
women.17  As this section will first discuss, the subsequent Equal Pay 
Act of 1963, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and the Lilly 
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, among other statutes, substantially shaped the 
landscape of federal pay equity law.18  Many state pay equity statutes 
retain the core language found in these federal laws.  The second part of 
this section provides an overview of Kansas’ statutory language, which 
has drawn from federal pay equity statutes.  Finally, the third part of this 
section surveys the recently updated California, Massachusetts, and New 
York statutes and their substantial alterations made to existing 
provisions.19  Categorizing state pay equity statutes and comparing those 
categories to California, Massachusetts, and New York’s statutory 
provisions prove helpful in highlighting how far those three states have 
pushed the frontier of state pay equity laws—and the ways in which 
those statutes, as well as Kansas’s law, have fallen short. 
A. Overview of Federal Pay Equity Statutes 
A survey of the history, provisions, and shortcomings of federal pay 
equity statutes provides a framework to understand the scope of state pay 
equity statutes that draw from federal law.  The evolution of federal pay 
equity law—including those bills Congress failed to pass—has produced 
legislative models from which to craft statutes aimed to be more 
effective in closing the wage gap than federal and state laws in effect.  
This section discusses the effective provisions and limitations of the 
Equal Pay Act, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the proposed 
Paycheck Fairness Act that Congress did not enact, and the Lilly 
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act. 
1. Early Attempts and the Equal Pay Act 
Initiatives to enact statutory pay equity provisions at the state and 
federal level in the United States began as early as 1944.20  That year, a 
bill introduced in the House of Representatives would have prohibited 
                                                          
 17.  See M. Neil Browne & Michael D. Meuti, Individualism and the Market Determination of 
Women’s Wages in the United States, Canada, and Hong Kong, 21 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 
355, 365 (1999) (noting that “attempts at pay equity legislation in the United States date back to the 
early years of the twentieth century”).  See also Cho & Kramer, supra note 16, at 2–5 (providing a 
timeline of major federal pay equity legislation in the United States). 
 18.  See Browne & Meuti, supra note 17, at 365–72; Cho & Kramer, supra note 16, at 2–5 
(outlining the timeline of federal pay equity statutes enacted in the United States). 
 19.  See infra Part II.B.3. 
 20.  See H.R. 5056, 78th Cong. (1944). 
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“[d]iscrimination against employees, in rates of compensation paid, on 
account of sex.”21  In 1945, Congress introduced legislation proposing 
women be compensated equally for “comparable work”—a standard that 
would cause controversy more than four decades later.22  While neither 
piece of legislation passed, every Congress from 1945 until 1981 
introduced bills requiring equal pay for “comparable work.”23 
These attempts to shrink the wage gap led to a watershed moment 
almost twenty years later, when Congress incorporated the landmark 
federal Equal Pay Act of 1963 into the Fair Labor Standards Act.24  The 
Equal Pay Act created the right for employees “within any 
establishment” to receive equal wages for “equal work on jobs the 
performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and 
which are performed under similar working conditions . . . .”25  A 
plaintiff bringing a claim under the law bears the initial burden of 
demonstrating a wage disparity.26  The burden then shifts to the employer 
to demonstrate one of four affirmative defenses: “(i) a seniority 
system”“; (ii) a merit system”“; (iii) a system which measures earnings 
by quantity or quality of production”“; or (iv) a differential based on any 
other factor other than sex.”27  The statute prohibits employers from 
decreasing wages to comply with its provisions.28  Damages under the 
federal statute include unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime 
compensation, as well as “an additional equal amount as liquidated 
damages.”29  Separate fines of up to $1,100 result if plaintiffs can prove 
employers willfully violated the law.30  Penalties are determined in part 
by business sizes and the seriousness of violations.31 
                                                          
 21.  Id. 
 22.  See also Elizabeth J. Wyman, The Unenforced Promise of Equal Pay Acts: A National 
Problem and Possible Solution from Maine, 55 ME. L. REV. 23, 24 n.5 (2003) (noting that “[t]he first 
bill proposing equal pay for women doing ‘“comparable work’” as men was introduced in 1945”). 
 23.  Cty. of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 185 n.1 (1981). 
 24.  Wyman, supra note 22, at 30. 
 25.  29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2012); Wyman, supra note 22, at 30. 
 26.  Wyman, supra note 22, at 32. 
 27.  29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2012); Wyman, supra note 22, at 31. 
 28.  29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2012). 
 29.  Id. § 216(b).  However, the Sixth Circuit in the 2014 case Michigan Corrections 
Organization v. Michigan Department of Corrections held that a state “does not violate the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause by denying the minimum-wage or overtime-pay requirement 
established by Congress in the [Fair Labor Standards Act]” and further held that pursuant to the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Congress could not authorize private rights of action against states brought 
under the Fair Labor Standards Act.  Mich. Corr. Org. v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 774 F.3d 895, 901–
02 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 30.  Id. § 216(e)(2). 
 31.  Id. § 216(e)(3). 
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Despite the Equal Pay Act’s status as a milestone, however, the 
“equal pay for equal work” definition left quite a bit of room for 
employers to develop seemingly non-pretextual reasons to explain 
compensation differences between male and female employees.32  To 
allow for wage discrepancies, employers would “only need to alter a job 
description along only one of the four axes used for measuring value to 
make a ‘man’s job’ different from a similar ‘woman’s job,’” thereby 
precluding a claim.33  There is also “little guidance”34 governing the 
somewhat-ambiguous35 work equality standard, rendering plaintiff 
successes under the Equal Pay Act relatively rare compared to outcomes 
of claims filed under other pay equity laws.36 
2. Title VII and the Paycheck Fairness Act: Broadening Pay Equity 
Law 
The Equal Pay Act was only the start of federal legislation that 
attempted to close the wage gap between men and women: shortly 
thereafter, Congress enacted Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 
which further protected employees from discrimination on the basis of 
sex, among other characteristics.37  More than 40 years later, Congress 
took up another significant bill on the pay equity landscape: the 
Paycheck Fairness Act,38 which, if passed, would have aligned federal 
pay equity law more closely with the provisions of California, 
Massachusetts, and New York’s strengthened statutes.  Title VII and the 
Paycheck Fairness Act addressed—or would have addressed—some of 
the Equal Pay Act’s shortcomings, but Title VII in particular still placed 
a heavy burden on plaintiffs bringing wage discrimination claims. 
                                                          
 32.  Browne & Meuti, supra note 17, at 366.  See also Wyman, supra note 22, at 31, 34 (noting 
that “the federal courts have interpreted the EPA narrowly, holding plaintiffs to a high burden of 
proof” and that “despite the admonition contained in the federal regulations that ‘insubstantial 
differences’ should not prevent a finding of equal work, the courts have not ‘reach[ed] beyond 
comparisons of virtually identical jobs, which in a workforce substantially segregated by gender, 
provides women with a very limited substantive right indeed’”).  
 33.  Browne & Meuti, supra note 17, at 366. 
 34.  Wyman, supra note 22, at 33. 
 35.  See Wyman, supra note 22, at 33 (noting that the Code of Federal Regulations “admit[s] 
that ‘what constitutes equal skill, equal effort, or equal responsibility cannot be precisely defined,’ 
although the section goes on to state that interpretation of these key terms must be done with 
consideration for the ‘broad remedial purpose of the law’”). 
 36.  Wyman, supra note 22, at 33. 
 37.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). 
 38.  S. 841, 109th Cong. (2005). 
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Title VII broadened employees’ abilities to bring claims beyond 
what was possible under the Equal Pay Act. 39  Though “the federal 
courts have interpreted the [Equal Pay Act] narrowly,” one federal 
district court noted that Title VII “‘requires a less-exacting degree of job 
similarity than is necessary to bring an [Equal Pay Act] action.’”40  In 
part, Title VII prohibits discrimination based on “race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin” in employment, specifically with regard to 
employees’ “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment.”41  To bring a claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the defendant “uses a particular employment practice 
that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin” and “fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is 
job related for the position in question and consistent with business 
necessity.”42  Congress separately amended the statute to incorporate the 
affirmative defenses of the Equal Pay Act: seniority, merit, quantity or 
quality of production, and factors other than sex.43  This modification, 
called the Bennett Amendment, sought to address the concern that 
plaintiffs would be able to bring claims under Title VII without being 
beholden to the Equal Pay Act’s “equal pay for equal work” standard.44  
Title VII does exempt wage differentials between “employees who work 
in different locations” as well as discrepancies that are “not the result of 
an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin.”45 
Title VII did continue to pose challenges for plaintiffs, however.  
The “difficulty of proving discrimination in a Title VII case” continued 
to create problems—and perpetuate relatively low success rates—for 
plaintiffs seeking to file under this statute as opposed to the Equal Pay 
Act.46  Courts narrowly construed the “disparate impact” plaintiffs must 
demonstrate to include only “cases that challenge a specific, clearly 
delineated employment practice applied at a single point in the job 
selection process,” not broad wage disparities between male and female 
employees in jobs dominated by employees of one sex.47  This limited 
                                                          
 39.  Wyman, supra note 22, at 32–33; Browne & Meuti, supra note 17, at 367–68. 
 40.  Wyman, supra note 22, at 31–33. 
 41.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). 
 42.  Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).   
 43.  Id. § 2000e-2(h).  See also Wyman, supra note 22, at 31–32. 
 44.   42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2012).  See also Wyman, supra note 22, at 32 (noting that “[i]n 
County of Washington v. Gunther, the Supreme Court held that the Bennett Amendment did not 
import the “equal pay for equal work” standard into Title VII”).  
 45.   42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2012).   
 46.  Wyman, supra note 22, at 33. 
 47.  Browne & Meuti, supra note 17, at 370. 
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plaintiffs’ abilities to challenge institutional wage discrimination simply 
because a field had been controlled by workers of the opposite sex.  
Plaintiffs’ burdens of proof also differ between Title VII and the Equal 
Pay Act: under Title VII, plaintiffs “maintain[] the burden of proof 
throughout the case, with the employer only having to set forth a 
plausibly nondiscriminatory reason for engaging in the conduct that has 
been alleged to be discriminatory.”48  Title VII also requires plaintiffs to 
show employers’ discriminatory intent.49 
Analogous to the buildup of equal pay efforts that culminated in the 
Equal Pay Act, significant attempts at pay equity legislation predated the 
2009 law.  Among the most significant was the 2005 Paycheck Fairness 
Act, introduced by then-Senator Hillary Clinton of New York and 
Representative Rosa DeLauro of Connecticut.50  Had Congress enacted 
it, the bill would have moved federal pay equity law closer to the 
boundaries recently created by California, Massachusetts, and New 
York.51  Regardless, the bill helped lay the groundwork for the Lilly 
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, the third major statutory development in the 
federal pay equity landscape that President Barack Obama signed into 
law in 2009.52 
The Paycheck Fairness Act sought to amend the Fair Labor 
Standards Act—just as the Equal Pay Act had done—and incorporate 
“nonretaliation provisions, enhance penalties, and allow the Secretary of 
Labor . . . to pursue compensatory or punitive damages.”53  The bill 
would have bolstered the “factor other than sex” affirmative defense 
incorporated into the Equal Pay Act and Title VII.54  It would have 
required employers to demonstrate that pay differentials resulted from 
“education, training[,] or experience.”55  The bill also would have only 
allowed employers to use this affirmative defense if the factor was “job-
related” or “further[ed] a legitimate business purpose,” unless the 
employee could show that an alternative practice would serve that 
purpose without creating a wage differential and that the employer 
                                                          
 48.  Wyman, supra note 22, at 32. 
 49.  See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 640 (2007) (noting that the 
Equal Pay Act “does not require the filing of a charge with the EEOC or proof of intentional 
discrimination” because the statute asks “only whether the alleged inequality resulted from ‘any 
other factor other than sex’”). 
 50.  S. 841, 109th Cong. (2005).  See also Cho & Kramer, supra note 16, at 4. 
 51.  See infra Part II.B.3. 
 52.  S. 181, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 53.  S. 841, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 54.  See id. § 3(a). 
 55.  Id. 
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refused to adopt the alternative practice.56  To have a valid defense, 
employers needed to apply such factors reasonably.57  The bill also 
would have prohibited employers from reducing employees’ wages to 
comply with its provisions.58 
The Paycheck Fairness Act would have granted greater employee 
protections by eliminating the “establishment requirement”59 of the 
Equal Pay Act.60  That requirement only allowed employees bringing 
claims under the Equal Pay Act to compare their salaries to others 
working within the same establishment.61  Deleting the “establishment” 
requirement would have amended the Equal Pay Act provisions that 
prohibited employers from “discriminat[ing], within any establishment in 
which . . . employees are employed, between employees on the basis of 
sex.”62  This modification would have broadened the scope within which 
employees could compare themselves to other employees to demonstrate 
pay disparities.63 
Further, the bill would have prohibited employers from retaliating 
against employees because they “inquired about, discussed, or otherwise 
disclosed the wages of the employee or another employee, or because 
[they have] made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any 
manner in an investigation, proceeding, hearing, or action.”64  Such a 
non-retaliation provision only exists as “part of the broader wage and 
hour protections of the Fair Labor Standards Act” with respect to the 
Equal Pay Act, and does not provide protections from retaliation as broad 
as those the Paycheck Fairness Act would have offered.65  The Paycheck 
Fairness Act would also have amended the Fair Labor Standard Act’s 
damages provisions and enabled the Secretary of Labor to seek 
additional damages.66  Plaintiffs would have been able to recover not 
only unpaid minimum wages and overtime compensation as well as 
                                                          
 56.  Id. § 3(a)(I)(aa). 
 57.  Id. § 3(a)(I)(bb). 
 58.  Id. § 3(a)(II). 
 59.  Id. § 3(c)(1)–(2).  
 60.  Id. §§ 3(c)(1)–(2), 3(d). 
 61.  See infra Part II.A.1. 
 62.  29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 63.  See S. 841, 109th Cong. § 3(c) (2005) (eliminating the requirement for employees bringing 
wage disparity claims to demonstrate the statutory element of discrimination between or among 
employees at the same establishment). 
 64.  Id. § 3(d)(2). 
 65.  29 U.S.C. § 206; LAURA S. SCHNELL & PETER A. BASSO, PROVING RETALIATION UNDER 
FEDERAL NON-DISCRIMINATION STATUTES 1 (2011), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/labor_law/meetings/2011/ac2011/041.a
uthcheckdam.pdf. 
 66.  S. 841, 109th Cong. § 3(e) (2005). 
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liquidated damages, but also compensatory and punitive damages from 
their employers.67  The bill would have authorized the Secretary of Labor 
to seek compensatory and punitive damages.68  The bill’s sponsors 
categorized the increased damages and non-retaliation provision as 
“[e]nhanced enforcement of equal pay requirements.”69  The sponsors 
recognized the need for such provisions because of “lingering effects of 
past discrimination” that persisted in preventing women from achieving 
pay equity, despite women “enter[ing] the workforce in record numbers” 
for half a century before the bill’s introduction, roughly since the passage 
of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII.70 
3. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act: Jurisprudential and Statutory Shifts 
Four years after the Paycheck Fairness Act failed to clear Congress, 
President Obama signed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act into law.71  The 
statute clarified when the statute of limitations on a Title VII wage 
discrimination claim begins to run and strengthened damages available 
for such claims.  Congress passed the law in reaction to a United States 
Supreme Court case, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 
involving the woman at the center of the eponymous legislation.72  The 
issues in the case were the timeliness of Lilly Ledbetter’s disparate 
impact claim and whether her employer had acted with discriminatory 
intent.73  Ledbetter alleged her employer’s performance reviews 
discriminated against her because of her sex and that as a result, she 
received lower pay compared to her male colleagues.74  Ledbetter filed a 
complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) in 1998.75 
The statute of limitations applied to Ledbetter’s claims depended 
upon the Court’s interpretation of the discriminatory “discrete act” Title 
                                                          
 67.  Id. § 3(e)(1) (providing, however, that the United States as an employer would not be held 
liable for punitive damages). 
 68.  Id. § 3(f). 
 69.  Id. § 3. 
 70.  Id. § 2(1)–(2). 
 71.  Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, S. 181, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 72.  Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007). 
 73.  Id. at 623 (noting that Ledbetter filed a writ of certiorari to resolve the issue of “[w]hether 
and under what circumstances a plaintiff may bring an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 alleging illegal pay discrimination when the disparate pay is received during the statutory 
limitations period, but is the result of intentionally discriminatory pay decisions that occurred outside 
the limitations period”). 
 74.  Id. at 621–22, 643. 
 75.  Id. at 621–22. 
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VII requires plaintiffs to demonstrate.76  Justice Samuel Alito, writing for 
the majority, noted Ledbetter alleged each amount she was paid was 
“unlawful” because her wages would have been higher had she not faced 
discrimination in her evaluations before filing her EEOC complaint.77  
The Court, however, held that Ledbetter should have filed her claim 
within 180 days—the Title VII statute of limitations—of a single 
discriminatory act: when Goodyear issued Ledbetter’s paychecks after 
her EEOC complaint, for example, or when Goodyear denied Ledbetter a 
raise in 1998.78  Justice Alito noted that while an employer could violate 
Title VII several times by taking several separate, intentionally 
discriminatory actions, a single discriminatory act followed by a series of 
nondiscriminatory acts producing “adverse effects” from the 
discrimination would not constitute several separate violations.79  The 
Court also found Ledbetter had not demonstrated that Goodyear acted 
with an intent to discriminate against her on the basis of her sex, as 
required by Title VII.80  Further, even if Ledbetter had shown intent, the 
Court found her “attempt to take the intent associated with the prior pay 
decisions and shift it to the 1998 pay decision” to be improper.81 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for the dissent, highlighted the 
practical difficulties of complying with the standard set out by the 
majority—and the statute itself.  “Pay disparities,” Justice Ginsburg 
wrote, “often occur, as they did in Ledbetter’s case, in small increments; 
cause to suspect that discrimination is at work develops only over 
time.”82  Employers might not disclose any information about wage 
differentials, further hindering notice to a potential plaintiff.83  
Employment decisions such as “promotions, transfers, hirings, and 
firings” allow employees to “immediately seek out an explanation and 
evaluate it for pretext.”84  “Compensation disparities”—particularly those 
resulting from male employees receiving larger pay raises than female 
employees—“are often hidden from sight,” Justice Ginsburg wrote.85  
The dissent noted that a plaintiff’s “initial readiness to give her employer 
the benefit of the doubt should not preclude her from later challenging 
                                                          
 76.  Id. at 621, 623–24. 
 77.  Id. at 624. 
 78.  Id.  
 79.  Id. at 628. 
 80.  Id. at 624. 
 81.  Id. at 629. 
 82.  Id. at 645 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 83.  Id.  
 84.  Id. at 649. 
 85.  Id.  
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the then current and continuing payment of a wage depressed on account 
of her sex.”86 
Congress subsequently passed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act to 
amend Title VII.87  The Act redefined the occurrence of a discriminatory 
employment practice as instances in which an employer adopts a 
“discriminatory compensation decision or other practice,” when an 
employee “becomes subject” to that type of decision or practice, or when 
an employee is affected by such a decision or practice.88  These decisions 
and practices include each instance of employers paying wages or other 
compensation resulting from discriminatory decisions.89  Further, 
prevailing plaintiffs can recover up to two years’ back pay that accrued 
before they filed their claims if the unlawful practices “are similar or 
related to” the practices that occurred after plaintiffs filed their claims.90 
Critics of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act have deemed it both 
overbroad and not broad enough.91  Most pertinent to the arguments in 
this Comment are critiques that the Act does not provide enough 
protection for workers; namely, the law is silent on pay confidentiality 
policies many employers have in place.92  By failing to even address 
employees who discuss their wages, the Act ignores the very reason 
prospective plaintiffs could bring wage discrimination claims: 
determining whether a wage discrepancy exists.93  Conversely, some 
view the Act as creating expansive exceptions to statutes of limitations 
that could infringe on employers’ rights to notice of potential claims, 
                                                          
 86.  Id. at 645. 
 87.  Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, S. 181, 111th Cong. (2009) (Congress found that Ledbetter 
“significantly impair[ed] statutory protections against discrimination in compensation that Congress 
established and that have been bedrock principles of American law for decades” and “unduly 
restrict[ed] the time period in which victims of discrimination can challenge and recover for 
discriminatory compensation decisions or other practices, contrary to the intent of Congress.”  
Congress echoed Justice Ginsburg’s dissent and noted that the decision “ignores the reality of wage 
discrimination and is at odds with the robust application of the civil rights laws that Congress 
intended.”). 
 88.  Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(3)(A) (2012). 
 89.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(3)(A) (2012). 
 90.  Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, S. 181, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–
5(e)(3)(B) (2012). 
 91.  See Brian P. O’Neill, Comment, Pay Confidentiality: A Remaining Obstacle to Equal Pay 
After Ledbetter, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1217, 1219–20 (2010) (discussing the lack of provisions in 
the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act curtailing pay confidentiality policies); Carolyn E. Sorock, Note, 
Closing the Gap Legislatively: Consequences of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, 85 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 1199, 1211–12 (2010) (noting concerns regarding the statute’s override of other established 
statutes of limitation); Hernaldo J. Baltodano & David Martinez, Determining the Reach of the Lilly 
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, L.A. LAW. 22–24 (June 2010) (identifying contradictions in lower courts in 
applying the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act). 
 92.  O’Neill, supra note 91, at 1218–19. 
 93.  Id. at 1221. 
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which statutes of limitation are designed to protect.94  The Act’s “other 
practice” language, which allows plaintiffs to bring claims after being 
“affected” by such practices, contributes to employer uncertainty about 
what types of practices could trigger a suit.95 
While several federal pay equity bills have been introduced but not 
passed since the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act was enacted—including a 
reintroduction of the Paycheck Fairness Act in 2013—much of the 
activity in the pay equity realm has occurred in the states.96  State pay 
equity laws provide additional models for structuring pay equity statutes 
and, much like their federal counterparts, have had varying degrees of 
success in closing the pay gap. 
B. Survey of State Pay Equity Statutes 
Current state pay equity laws offer varying levels of protection 
against wage discrimination for employees.  Most importantly, state 
statutes differ in the parity of work responsibilities and duties employees 
are required to demonstrate before bringing wage discrimination claims 
and in the geographic scope within which employees can make 
comparisons to show wage disparities.  This section surveys the 
landscape of current state pay equity laws, provides a deeper analysis of 
Kansas’s statute, and turns to California, Massachusetts, and New York’s 
statutes to develop a framework for proposing changes to Kansas’s law 
in Part III of this Comment. 
1. Four Categories of State Pay Equity Statutes 
States that have pay equity laws on their books can be divided into 
four categories based on their statutory language.  As of January 2017, 
forty-four states have enacted statutory provisions prohibiting wage 
discrimination on the basis of sex.97  Alabama and Mississippi do not 
                                                          
 94.  Sorock, supra note 91, at 1211–12. 
 95.  Baltodano & Martinez, supra note 91, at 22. 
 96.  See Cho & Kramer, supra note 16, at 4–5 (listing the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Restoration Act, introduced in both houses of Congress in 2012, the Fair Pay Act, introduced in both 
houses of Congress in 2013, and the Fair Minimum Wage Act, introduced in both houses of 
Congress in 2013, as examples of such legislation since the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act). 
 97.  See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.80.220(a)(5) (West 2007); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-341 
(2012) (West); ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-4-601 (West 2014); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1197.5 (West 2011); 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-5-102 (West 2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-75 (West 2011); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 1107A (West 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.07 (West 2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 
34-5-3 (West 2003); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2.3 (West 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 44-1702 (WEST 
2006); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/1, 112/1, 125/1 (West 2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-2-2-4(d) 
(West 2005); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 70A.18, 216.6A (West 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1205 (West 
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have laws requiring employers to equally compensate employees doing 
equal work regardless of sex.98  The District of Columbia, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Utah, and Wisconsin do not have specific 
prohibitions against wage discrimination on the basis of sex; rather, 
statutes in those jurisdictions have general employment discrimination 
prohibitions.99 
Despite the fact that a majority of states have enacted some form of 
pay equity statutory provisions, statutory language distinguishes those 
states in four significant ways.100  The first two categories paint a broad 
picture of the context of the pay equity landscape in their respective 
states.  First, some statutes feature provisions specifically tailored to 
wage discrimination on the basis of sex, while others include sex within 
a list of characteristics that employers in those states are prohibited from 
using as the basis for wage discrepancies.101  Second, some state statutes 
                                                          
2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 337.420–23 (West 2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23:301, 23:661 
(2014); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 628 (2007); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-301 (West 
2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 105A (West 2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 408.423, 
750.556 (West 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.66 (West 2006); MO. REV. STAT. § 290.410 (2000); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-3-104 (2013); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-1221 (West 2009); NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 608.017 (West 2014); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:37 (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
34:11-56.2 (West 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-23-1 (West 2013); N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 194, 198 
(McKinney 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 34-06.1-01 (West 2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
4111.17 (West 2016); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 198.1 (West 2014); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
652.220 (West 2011); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 336.1 (West 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-6-
18 (West 2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-12-15 (2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-2-202 (West 
2012); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 21.001, 659.001 (West 2015); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 495(a)(7), 
495(b) (West 2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.6 (West 2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.12.175 
(West 2008); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 21-5B-1, 21-5E-1 (West 2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-4-301 
(West 2007). 
 98.  See also State Equal Pay Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/equal-pay-laws.aspx (last visited Mar. 31, 
2017) (listing all states’ wage discrimination laws or lack of laws and specifying each statute’s 
language). 
 99.  See D.C. CODE § 2-1402 (2012) (prohibiting general employment discrimination); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 143-422.1 (West 2000) (prohibiting general employment discrimination); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 1-13-30 (2005) (prohibiting general employment discrimination); UTAH CODE ANN. § 
34A-5-101 (West 2013) (prohibiting general employment discrimination); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
111.31 (West 2002) (prohibiting general employment discrimination). 
 100.  See State Equal Pay Laws, supra note 98 (showing, based on a survey of statutory text, that 
four major categories of pay equity laws exist).  
 101.  Compare ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.80.220(a)(5), ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-340–41, 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-4-601, CAL. LAB. CODE § 1197.5, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-5-101, CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-75, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 1107A, 1113, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.07, GA. 
CODE ANN. § 34-5-3, HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2.3, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 44-1701, 820 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 110/1, 112/1, 125/1, IND. CODE ANN. § 22-2-2-4(d), KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1205, KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 337.420–23, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23:301, 23:661, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
26, § 628, MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMPL. § 3-301, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 105A, MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 408.423, 750.556, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.66, MO. REV. STAT. § 290.410, 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-3-104, NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-1221, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 608.017, 
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apply to all employers, while others apply only to private or only to 
public employers.102 
Statutes in the third and fourth categories incorporate language from 
enacted and proposed federal legislation.  Some state statutes require 
employees to demonstrate that they received lower wages than other 
employees on the basis of sex for the “same” or “equal” work, while 
other statutes require only “comparable” work or include no language 
governing comparisons of employee responsibilities or skill levels.103  
More specifically, some state statutes include additional requirements for 
employees’ skill levels, responsibilities, and working conditions that 
plaintiffs must meet to bring wage disparity claims.104 
Finally, statutes in the fourth category address the geographic scope 
plaintiffs are afforded to make wage comparisons.  Some state statutes 
require employees claiming wage discrimination to work at the same 
establishment, while others allow a broader geographic scope for wage 
comparison purposes.105 
                                                          
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:37, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-56.2, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-23-1, N.Y. 
LAB. LAW §§ 194, 198, N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 34-06.1-01, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4111.17, 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 198.1, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 652.220, 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 
336.1, R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-6-18, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-12-15, TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-2-
202, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 21.001, 659.001, VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.6, WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 49.12.175, W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 21-5B-1, 21-5E-1, and WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-4-301, with 
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 70A.18, 216.6A, and VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 495(a)(7), 495(b). 
 102.   See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.66; N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 194, 198; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
40, § 198.1 (applying pay equity provisions to private employers only); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.  
§§ 23:301, 23:661; TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 21.001, 659.001 (applying pay equity provisions to 
public employers only); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.07; GA. CODE ANN. § 34-5-3; 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 110/1, 112/1, 125/1; IND. CODE ANN. § 22-2-2-4(d); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 337.420–23; 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 408.423, 750.556; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-23-1 (applying pay equity 
provisions to employers that hire a certain minimum number of employees). 
 103.  Compare ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.80.220(a)(5), ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-340–41, 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 1107A, 1113, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.07, GA. CODE ANN. § 34-5-3, HAW. 
REV. STAT. § 378-2.3–2.5, IND. CODE ANN. § 22-2-2-4(d), KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1205, MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 181.66, MO. REV. STAT. § 290.410, MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-3-104, NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
48-1221, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 608.017, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:37, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-
23-1, N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 194, 198, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4111.17, R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-6-
18, VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.6, W. VA. CODE ANN., §§ 21-5B-1, 21-5E-1, and WYO. STAT. ANN. § 
27-4-301, with ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-4-601, CAL. LAB. CODE § 1197.5, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-
5-101, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-75, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 44-1701, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
110/1, 112/1, 125/1, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 337.420–23, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23:301, 23:661, 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 628, MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-301, MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 149, § 105A, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 408.423, 750.556, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-56.2, 
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 34-06.1-01, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 198.1, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
652.220, 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 336.1, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-12-15, TENN. CODE ANN. § 
50-2-202, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§  21.001, 659.001, and WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.12.175. 
 104.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 1107(A), 1113; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.07; GA. CODE ANN. § 34-
5-3; HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2.3; 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/1, 112/1, 125/1; IND. CODE ANN. 
§22-2-2-4(d); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.66; N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 194, 198. 
 105.  See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-340–41; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 1107(A), 1113; GA. 
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(a) Specificity of Wage Discrimination Provisions 
Broadly, forty-two of the forty-four states that have enacted pay 
equity laws, including Kansas, have done so by specifically prohibiting 
wage discrimination on the basis of sex.106  However, Iowa and Vermont 
have included sex as one of several categories upon which employers 
cannot base wage discrepancies, analogous to Title VII’s provisions.107  
Iowa’s wage discrimination statute broadly prohibits discrimination 
based on the “age, race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender 
identity, national origin, religion, or disability” of an employee.108  
Vermont’s statute also includes sex as one prohibited basis for wage 
differences within the state’s employment discrimination law.109 
(b) Applicability of State Statutes to Employers 
Thirteen states place some form of restriction on the applicability of 
their pay equity statutes, whether those statutes apply only to private or 
public employers or whether the statutes require an employer to have a 
minimum number of employees before the law applies.110  While 
                                                          
CODE ANN. § 34-5-3; HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2.3–2.5; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 44-1701; IND. CODE 
ANN. §22-2-2-4(d); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 70A.18, 216.6A; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1205; KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 337.420–23; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 628; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 
408.423, 750.556; MO. REV. STAT. § 290.410; MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-3-104; NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 48-1221; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 608.017; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-23-1; N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 194, 
198; 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 336.1; TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-2-202; VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.6; 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-4-301 (requiring plaintiffs bringing wage discrimination claims to work at 
the “same establishment” as the employee or employees to whom plaintiffs compare their wages); 
see also ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.80.220(a)(5) (requiring that plaintiffs compare their wages to 
other employees’ wages within the “same locality”). 
 106.  See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.80.220(a)(5); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-340, 341; ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 11-4-601; CAL. LAB. CODE § 1197.5; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-5-101; CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 31-75; 19 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 1107(a), 1113; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.07; GA. 
CODE ANN. § 34-5-3; HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2.3–2.5; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 44-1701; 820 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/1, 112/1, 125/1; IND. CODE ANN. §22-2-2-4(d); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1205; 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 337.420–23; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23:661, 23:301; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 26, § 628; MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-301; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 105A; MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.556, 408.423; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.66; MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.410; 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-3-104; NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-1221; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 608.017; 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:37; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-56.1; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-23-1; N.Y. 
LAB. LAW §§ 194, 198; N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 34-06.1-01; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4111.17; 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 198.1; OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 652.220; 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 
336.1; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-6-18; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-12-15; TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-2-
201; TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 659.001, 21.001; VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.6; WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 49.12.175; W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 21-5B-1, 21-5E-1; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-4-301. 
 107.  See IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 70A.18, 216.6A; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 495(a)(7), 495(b). 
 108.  IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 70A.18, 216.6A. 
 109.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 495(a)(7), 495(b). 
 110.  See State Equal Pay Laws, supra note 98. 
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Kansas’s statute makes no such distinctions,111 Minnesota, New York, 
and Oklahoma’s statutes all solely apply to private employers,112 and 
Louisiana and Texas’s statutes apply only to public employers.113  
Several states require an employer, regardless of whether private or 
public, to have a certain number of employees to be subject to the 
statute.114  For example, Nebraska’s statute only applies to private 
employers if an employer has fifteen or more employees.115 
(c) Equal, Comparable, and Similar Work Requirements 
Substantively, states fall along a wider spectrum with respect to their 
requirements that employees bringing wage discrimination claims do 
“equal work” or only “comparable work” to their higher-paid 
counterparts.116  Twenty-two of the forty-three states that have enacted 
pay equity laws, including Kansas, statutorily require that employees 
receiving different wages do “equal” or the “same” work.117  This 
                                                          
 111.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1205 (West 2000). 
 112.  MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.66 (West 2006); N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 194, 198 (McKinney 2009); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 198.1 (West 2014). 
 113.  LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23:301, 23:661 (2014); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 21.001, 659.001 
(West 2015). 
 114.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.07 (West 2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-5-3 (West 2003); 820 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/1, 112/1, 125/1 (West 2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-2-2-4(d) (West 2005); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 337.420–23 (West 2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 408.423, 750.556 
(West 2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-23-1 (West 2013). 
 115.  NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-1221 (West 2009). 
 116.  See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.80.220(A)(5) (West 2007); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-340–
41 (2012) (West); ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-4-601 (West 2014); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1197.5 (West 2011); 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-5-101 (West 2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-75 (West 2011); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 1107A, 1113 (West 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.07 (West 2013); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 34-5-3 (West 2003); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2.3 (West 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 44-1701 
(West 2006); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/1, 112/1, 125/1 (West 2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-2-
2-4(d) (West 2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1205 (West 2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 337.420–23 
(West 2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23:301, 23:661 (2014); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 628 
(2007); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL.§ 3-301 (West 2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 
105A (West 2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 408.423, 750.556 (West 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
181.66 (West 2006); MO. REV. STAT. § 290.410 (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-3-104 (2013); NEB. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-1221 (West 2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 608.017 (West 2014); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 275:37 (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-56.1 (West 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-23-1 
(West 2013); N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 194, 198 (McKinney 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 34-06.1-01 
(West 2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4111.17 (West 2016); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 198.1 
(West 2014); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 652.220 (West 2011); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 336.1 (West 
2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-6-18 (West 2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-12-15 (2009); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 50-2-202 (West 2012); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 21.001, 659.001 (West 2015); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.6 (West 2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.12.175 (West 2008); W. VA. 
CODE, ANN. §§ 21-5B-1, 21-5E-1 (West 2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-4-301 (West 2007). 
 117.  ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 18.80.220(a)(5) (West 2007); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-340–341 
(West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1107(a), 1113 (West 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.07 
(West 2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-5-3 (West 2003); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2.3 (West 2008); IND. 
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standard mirrors the Equal Pay Act’s “equal work” language.118  As 
under the federal statute, the definition of equal work allows courts to 
take into consideration the skill, effort, responsibility, and conditions 
under which employees work to determine if the jobs are in fact equal.119 
The remaining twenty-one states allow more flexibility by requiring 
“comparable work.”120  The trend toward incorporating the comparable 
work standard began in the 1970s, and the discussion became national in 
the 1980s.121  Comparable work systems “seek to give individuals 
working on jobs involving similar skills, training, work conditions, or 
other terms of employment, the same wages.”122  Such systems can be 
executed by assigning points to the aforementioned factors which, when 
totaled, provide “an aggregate of . . . a job’s ‘worth’” and theoretically 
would result in equal compensation.123  However, comparable work 
standards are complicated by the discretion that employers, government 
agencies, and judges have in evaluating the criteria used to establish 
comparable employment positions.124 
Some states create additional guidelines for comparing jobs and 
wages.  For example, some states include language in their pay equity 
laws requiring equal work but only “similar” working conditions.125  
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, and 
                                                          
CODE ANN. § 22-2-2-4(d) (West 2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1205 (West 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 181.66 (West 2006); MO. REV. STAT. § 290.410 (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-3-104 (2013); 
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-1221 (West 2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 608.017 (West 2014); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:37 (2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-23-1 (West 2013); N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 194, 
198 (McKinney 2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4111.17 (West 2016); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-6-
18 (West 2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.6 (West 2014); W. VA. CODE. ANN. §§ 21-5B-1, 21-5E-1 
(West 2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-4-301 (West 2007). 
 118.  29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2012). 
 119.  Wyman, supra note 22, at 37–39. 
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New York all mandate that jobs being compared require “equal skill, 
effort and responsibility” and are “performed under similar working 
conditions.”126 
(d) Geographic Scope of Comparison 
Still other states create restrictions on the geographic scope within 
which employees can compare wages to other employees’ compensation 
to demonstrate wage discrimination.  These “establishment” provisions 
are analogous to the Equal Pay Act’s establishment language, which the 
Paycheck Fairness Act attempted to remove.127  Alaska’s statute, for 
example, requires only that employee comparisons occur within the 
“same locality.”128  However, Kansas, among twenty-one other states, 
requires employees bringing wage discrimination claims to compare their 
wages to higher-paid employees at the same “establishment.”129 
2. Kansas’s Current Pay Equity Statute 
Despite its lack of flexibility when compared to California, New 
York, and Massachusetts’s statutory provisions, which will be discussed 
in the next section, Kansas’s pay equity law does share statutory 
language with other states.  With respect to the four divisions 
differentiating state pay equity statutes nationally,130 Kansas’s current 
pay equity statute, codified at Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 44-1205, 44-1210, and 
44-1211, applies to all employers, public and private.131  The law falls 
into the “equal work” category with twenty-one other states.132  Kansas’s 
statute does not include language that would substantially broaden the 
scope of comparison employees bringing claims under the statute could 
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 130.  See supra Part II.B.1. 
 131.  KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1205, 44-1210, 44-1211 (West 2000). 
 132.  Id. § 44-1205. 
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use for support.  For example, the state only allows for comparison of 
“similar working conditions”—the statute requires equality of the 
employee “skill, effort, and responsibility” being evaluated.133  Kansas’s 
statute also does not have wage transparency protections, as the federal 
Paycheck Fairness Act would have instituted, for employees who discuss 
compensation.134  The law does, however, include the same affirmative 
defenses as the Equal Pay Act and Title VII: seniority, merit systems, 
quantity or quality of production, or factors other than sex.135 
Provisions governing damages for wage discrimination in Kansas 
mirror other states’ statutes but add monetary penalties for certain 
conduct.136  Kansas’s law requires employers in violation of the statute to 
pay employees the total amount of unpaid wages and overtime 
compensation, notwithstanding any agreement between the employer and 
employee.137  The statute allows for a minimum $250 and maximum 
$1,000 fine for violations of its pay equity provision.138  Kansas’s law 
does include an anti-retaliation provision: employers that fire or broadly 
discriminate against employees because of complaints filed, legal claims 
filed, or testimony given in a wage discrimination case under the statute 
are automatically considered to have violated the statute and garner an 
additional fine of $250 to $1,000.139  However, Kansas’s statute does not 
include liquidated damages tied to the total amount of underpaid 
wages.140 
3. The New Frontier of Pay Equity: California, New York, and 
Massachusetts’s Statutes 
Certain state legislatures’ trends toward augmenting pay equity 
statutes have been deemed “sweeping changes” compared to the relative 
stagnancy of federal pay equity statutes.141  New York and California 
enacted pay equity statutes at the end of 2015 that went into effect at the 
beginning of 2016 and 2017, respectively.142  A session law enacted in 
Massachusetts in 2016 expands that state’s pay equity provisions in 
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 134.  Id. 
 135.  Id. 
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“impactful” and “noteworthy” ways in comparison to other states’ 
laws.143  These laws demonstrate shifts away from the “equal pay for 
equal work” standard espoused by the Equal Pay Act and include 
amendments that more narrowly tailor affirmative defenses, include new 
anti-retaliation provisions, and incorporate additional damages. 
(a) California’s 2015 Pay Equity Amendments 
California’s new pay equity provisions broadened employees’ 
abilities to bring wage discrimination claims and strengthened damages 
and non-retaliation provisions.  The law moved the state from an “equal 
pay for equal work” standard to a “substantially similar work” standard, 
amended affirmative defenses and damages, and added language 
preventing employers from retaliating against employees bringing wage 
discrimination claims.144  The state’s new statute marks a shift away from 
Equal Pay Act-like language toward provisions more reminiscent of 
those proposed in the failed Paycheck Fairness Act.145  The amended 
provisions require employees filing wage discrimination claims to show 
that they and their counterparts of the opposite sex perform “substantially 
similar work, when viewed as a composite of skill, effort, and 
responsibility . . . under similar working conditions . . . .”146 
California’s statute also limits employer defenses and adds damages 
available to plaintiffs and anti-retaliation provisions.  Systems based on 
seniority, merit, measures of earnings based on production quantity or 
quality, or “a bona fide factor other than sex” (such as “education, 
training, or experience”) are legal bases under the California law upon 
which to differentiate among employee wages.147  But the law defines a 
“factor other than sex” more specifically than its predecessor: such a 
factor cannot be “based on or derived from” employees’ sexes, must be 
related to the employees’ jobs, and must be “consistent with a business 
necessity.”148  A business necessity is an “overriding legitimate business 
purpose” that the factor fulfills.149  The law negates such affirmative 
defenses, however, if an employee can show an “alternative business 
practice . . . that would serve the same business purpose without 
                                                          
 143.  Waterfield, supra note 141. 
 144.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 1197.5(a). 
 145.  See supra Part II.A.1. 
 146.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 1197.5(a). 
 147.  Id. § 1197.5(a)(1)(A)–(D). 
 148.  Id. § 1197.5(a)(1)(D). 
 149.  Id. 
856 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 65 
producing the wage differential.”150  To be non-pretextual, these 
factors—or affirmative defenses—must be “applied reasonably” and 
serve as the reasoning behind the wage difference in its entirety.151  
Affirmative defenses under California’s statute are substantially more 
defined and place a higher burden on employers than the federal pay 
equity statutes do.152  Also more strictly defined in the new statute are 
damages, which have changed to match the federal Equal Pay Act’s (and 
Paycheck Fairness Act’s) damages153: in addition to unpaid wages with 
interest, the state statute also allows for the same amount in liquidated 
damages.154 
Finally, the California statute includes new provisions governing the 
relationship between employers and employees.  Similar to Kansas’s 
statute, the law has an anti-retaliation provision that applies to employers 
with respect to employees who make pay equity claims.155  Unlike 
Kansas’s law, however, the California statute also restricts employers 
from creating rules that prohibit employees from talking about their 
wages—though employees cannot be forced to discuss their wages—or 
prohibit “encouraging any other employee to exercise his or her rights” 
under the law.156  This amendment also moves California’s new statute 
toward the provisions envisioned by the Paycheck Fairness Act.157 
(b) New York’s 2015 Pay Equity Amendments 
New York’s pay equity law closely resembles the new provisions in 
California’s law with a few key differences in the scope of comparison 
employees can make when bringing claims and available affirmative 
defenses.  New York’s statute is more restrictive than California’s law in 
the breadth employees have to compare themselves to their counterparts 
to prove wage discrepancies: the law requires employees to perform jobs 
that necessitate “equal skill, effort and responsibility . . . under similar 
working conditions . . . .”158  The four acceptable factors employers can 
use as bases for wage differences are the same as those in California’s 
law: seniority, merit, measures of earnings based on production quantity 
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or quality, or “a bona fide factor other than sex.”159  New York’s statute 
requires that when employers use “factor[s] other than sex” to explain 
wage discrepancies, those factors cannot cause a “disparate impact on the 
basis of sex.”160  California’s statute does not include such a mandate’.161  
Such a factor, as in California’s statutory language, must be “consistent 
with business necessity.”162  In New York’s statute, a “business 
necessity” is a factor that “bears a manifest relationship to the 
employment in question.”163  Further, the statute negates these 
affirmative defenses if an employee shows not only “an alternative 
employment practice exists that would serve the same business purpose 
and not produce [a wage] differential,” but also “that the employer has 
refused to adopt such alternative practice.”164  New York’s statute 
therefore places a second burden on plaintiffs that California’s statute 
does not.165 
Another difference in New York’s law is its requirement that 
employees work at the “same establishment” to form a basis of 
comparison under the state’s pay equity statute, which California does 
not mandate.166  However, further statutory definition demonstrates that 
this requirement is broader than it appears on its face and broader than 
the Equal Pay Act’s “same establishment” provision.167  New York’s law 
allows for employees filing wage disparity claims to compare themselves 
to other employees working “for the same employer at workplaces 
located in the same geographical region, no larger than a county, taking 
into account population distribution, economic activity, and/or the 
presence of municipalities.”168  For instance, assuming a court found a 
favorable population distribution and sufficient municipalities and 
economic activity in Onondaga County, New York, where the city of 
Syracuse is located, an employee would be able to compare his or her 
wages to another employee of the same employer anywhere in Onondaga 
County. 
Finally, New York’s law also prohibits employers from restricting 
employees’ conversations about wages, a provision absent from Kansas’s 
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statute.169  However, New York’s law allows for some limitations on 
wage discussions, which California’s statute does not incorporate.170  In 
New York, employers can “establish reasonable workplace and workday 
limitations on the time, place and manner for inquires [sic] about, 
discussion of, or the disclosure of wages.”171  An example might include 
a prohibition against two employees discussing a third employee’s wages 
without that employee’s consent.172  New York’s statute allows an 
employer to use an employee’s violation of such a reasonable limitation 
on wage discussions as an affirmative defense.173  Consistent with 
California’s pay equity statute, however, New York’s law does not 
obligate an employee to reveal or discuss his or her wages.174 
A separate section of New York’s statute addresses damages.175  
Employees can recover the total amount of underpaid wages and, as in 
California’s statute, up to the same amount in liquidated damages.176  
Courts award liquidated damages if an employer cannot show “a good 
faith basis to believe that its underpayment of wages was in compliance 
with the law.”177  However, in contrast to California’s statute, employees 
bringing claims in New York can recover up to three times the amount of 
underpaid wages if they prove their employers’ violation of the statute 
was willful.178 
(c) Massachusetts’s 2016 Pay Equity Amendments 
Massachusetts’s recently passed pay equity session law also bears 
similarities to California and New York’s statutes, though 
Massachusetts’s law broadens the recovery available to employees 
bringing claims.179  Massachusetts has imported the “comparable work” 
standard that several other states use.180  The state’s new statute requires 
employees claiming wage discrimination to show they do “comparable 
work” to employees used as a basis for comparison.181  The law defines 
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comparable work as that which “requires substantially similar skill, effort 
and responsibility and is performed under similar working conditions”—
language that mirrors California’s statutory text.182  Massachusetts’s 
statute, however, also adds that “a job title or . . . description alone” is 
not determinative of comparable jobs.183  Massachusetts also more 
closely defines “working conditions”—unlike California and New 
York—as a combination of “reasonable shift differentials” and “the 
physical surroundings and hazards encountered by employees 
performing a job,” among other factors.184 
Massachusetts’s statute includes variations of the affirmative 
defenses that California and New York’s statutes incorporate.  These 
include systems based on seniority or merit or that “measures earnings 
by quantity or quality of production, sales, or revenue,” as well as 
differences in “education, training or experience to the extent such 
factors are reasonably related to the particular job in question.”185  
However, Massachusetts’s law also includes the employer’s location and 
the “regular[ity] and necess[ity]” of employee travel as additional 
employer justifications for pay differentials.186 
Massachusetts’s law incorporates anti-retaliation provisions similar 
to those in California and New York’s statutes, though Massachusetts’s 
statute more specifically defines permissible conversations about wages 
and protections from retaliation.  The law restricts employers’ ability to 
curtail employee discussions about wages.187  However, Massachusetts’s 
statute also prohibits questions about past wages a prospective employee 
earned or criteria for past wages unless the prospective employee 
consents to disclose such information.188  The anti-retaliation provision, 
similar to the analogous provision in Kansas’s law, protects employees 
filing complaints, voicing opposition to practices that would be 
violations of the statute, testifying about investigations under the statute, 
or discussing or asking about their own or other employees’ wages.189 
Damages under Massachusetts’s law are the same as those under 
California and New York’s laws: the total amount of unpaid wages and 
up to the same amount in liquidated damages.190  The statute adds that 
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“agreement[s] between the employer and . . . employee to work for less 
than the wage to which the employee is entitled” under the statute and 
the employee’s “previous wage or salary history” are not available as 
affirmative defenses.191 
III. ANALYSIS 
Despite both the federal government and most states’ enactments of 
laws prohibiting wage disparities based on sex, the wage gap persists.192  
Kansas in particular runs the risk of falling well behind the movement 
toward expanding pay equity statutes.  The state did not shift from its 
“equal pay for equal work” framework to a “comparable work” standard 
when the latter was introduced in the 1970s and 1980s.193  The “equal 
work” standard presents a significant hurdle for plaintiffs: rates of 
success under older pay equity regimes such as the Equal Pay Act, which 
included an “equal work” provision, are as low as 24% in federal 
appellate courts,194 with widely fluctuating rates across the federal 
circuits.195  As states begin to broaden their pay equity laws beyond even 
the “comparable work” standard, Kansas likely will fall further out of 
sync with national pay equity trends if it does not make a statutory 
change. 
To take more effective steps to close its persistent wage gap, Kansas 
should adopt common portions of the California, Massachusetts, and 
New York laws as well as portions of Paycheck Fairness Act and Lilly 
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act to more adequately enable plaintiffs to bring pay 
equity claims and address the aforementioned economic policy concerns.  
Kansas should shift from an “equal work” standard to a “comparable 
work” or “substantially similar work” standard.  This would allow 
plaintiffs to avoid the strict interpretations of “equal work” language, as 
employees bringing claims under the Equal Pay Act have experienced.  
The state should also adopt provisions that provide better definitions of 
the affirmative defenses available to employers to curtail the 
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development of pretextual reasons for wage disparities under “equal 
work” statutory regimes.196  Finally, Kansas should amend its pay equity 
statute to include protections for wage discussions to provide employees 
with more opportunities for notice about potential wage disparities.197 
The rationale behind the statutory models Kansas should follow in 
California, Massachusetts, and New York is certainly grounded in the 
basic social justice proposition that women should earn the same wages 
as men do for performing the same or substantially similar work.198  This 
reasoning is saliently and importantly evident in the language these three 
state legislatures have used in their bills to strengthen pay equity laws.199  
These three laws, however, were also driven in large part by the 
economic burden lower wages are placing on women, families, and those 
states’ economies as a whole.200  Because women are working in higher 
numbers than ever before, the economic concerns that California, 
Massachusetts, and New York’s legislatures expressed are important 
factors supporting broader pay equity laws in states such as Kansas, 
which has also seen women become an integral part of its workforce. 
A. The Economic Argument for Pay Equity 
The wage gap between men and women has closed only slightly 
despite years of Congress and state legislatures’ statutory enactments 
aimed at combating this disparity.  While women’s employment 
decisions drive some of these wage discrepancies, data show that 
lawmakers and courts alike should not extrapolate this explanation to 
assume women have independently created the persistent national wage 
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gap.  Such a perspective precludes the use of policy and adjudicative 
tools available to minimize the impact wage discrimination has on 
women, in particular working mothers and women living below the 
poverty line. 
1. The Wage Gap 
Decades of enforced federal and state pay equity laws have had 
limited impact on the wage gap between men and women.  In 1979, 
fifteen years after Title VII was enacted—and the first year comparative 
wage data was collected—American women were only earning 63% of 
their male counterparts’ salaries.201  In 1992, that figure was 71%.202  The 
national wage gap closed only slightly by 2000, as women’s wages rose 
to 76% of men’s wages over the next eight years.203  The most recent 
data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics show an even smaller increase 
over the last fifteen years.204  For “workers age 35 and older, women 
earned between 76 and 81 percent of what their male counterparts earned 
in 2014.”205  In Kansas, the most recent data show that women fall on the 
lower end of the wage differential spectrum nationally: Kansas women 
earn about 71% of the salaries their male counterparts earn.206 
It would be an oversimplification to attribute these disparities solely 
to the fact that women are paid less than men.  Women’s increased 
participation in the workforce over time and their more predominant 
representation in some job sectors over others complicate wage 
differential calculations.207  Further, economists have argued that 
eliminating wage differentials between men and women would be 
counterproductive because a greater number of women would enter 
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“already overcrowded occupation[s], yet leave more workers 
unemployed since the higher wages would be expected to reduce the 
number of jobs available.”208 
However, the data creates a persuasive case against the argument that 
women’s choice of employment largely explains the wage gap.209  The 
disparity between men and women’s wages exists regardless of the field 
in which women work, whether full-time or part-time, or the educational 
level women have attained.210  The gap between women and men’s 
salaries ranges from women earning 71% of what men earn to 87% 
across the health care, social assistance, manufacturing, retail, and 
educational services industries.211  Women across the employment 
hierarchy within companies also consistently earn less than their male 
counterparts at the same levels.212  Women in management positions earn 
about 80 cents for every dollar men earn, and in office and administrative 
support positions, women earn about 87 cents on the dollar compared to 
men.213  The highest level of education a woman attains also does not put 
her above her male colleagues in terms of salary.214  For full-time 
employees, “women with doctoral degrees are paid less than men with 
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master’s degrees, and women with master’s degrees are paid less than 
men with bachelor’s degrees.”215 
Scholars have argued that simply assuming what women’s choices 
will be with respect to employment and education is detrimental because 
it ignores other possible tools to close the wage gap, such as through 
more effectively enforced statutes that lend themselves to more effective 
enforcement.216  With its current statutory language, Kansas is not 
making use of these tools to close its wage gap between men and women.  
Enacting more specific protections for women to pursue pay equity 
claims will benefit the state economically. 
2. The Wage Gap’s Impact on the Economy 
Scholars and state legislatures alike have recognized the economic 
importance of using statutory tools to help close the wage gap.  In 
particular, wage gap laws would have a substantial positive impact on 
working mothers, whose presence in the workforce has increased 
significantly over several decades.217  California and New York’s 
legislatures specifically addressed their concerns about the economic 
consequences of the persistent wage gaps between men and women in 
their states.218  By improving statutory pay equity protections, Kansas 
can both address a significant social inequity and improve sectors of its 
economy. 
Women’s roles in the workplace—particularly as mothers in the 
workplace—have grown considerably since the 1970s,219about a decade 
after the Equal Pay Act was enacted.  In 1975, 36% of all families were 
two-earner households; in 1993, that percentage rose to nearly half of all 
families.220  That 1993 figure has remained consistent in the most recent 
Bureau of Labor Statistics data: 48% of all families are two-earner 
families.221  Today, women are the sole earners for just over 7% of 
families.222  Nearly 70% of all women with children under the age of 18 
are working or seeking employment.223 
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In Kansas specifically, because the state’s women consistently earn 
less than men, they lose out on “more than $4.5 billion every year due to 
the wage gap.”224  Policy groups have estimated that by closing the wage 
gap, Kansas women could afford about “81 more weeks of food for 
[their] famil[ies] (nearly two years’ worth); [n]ine more months of 
mortgage and utilities payments; or [f]ourteen more months of rent.”225  
Those statistics are placed into stark relief when juxtaposed with the fact 
that 31% of Kansas’s women-led households live below the poverty line, 
where significant expansions in food and rent affordability are critical.226 
By maintaining a system in which women are consistently paid 
lower wages than men across occupations, positions, and education 
levels, Kansas allows women to be placed at an economic disadvantage.  
Such a handicap leads to diminished financial resources for these 
women’s families, particularly in women-led households and households 
operating on a sub-poverty-line income.  In turn, women are unable to 
invest income into their families and communities and “lessen their 
reliance on public assistance programs.”227  For instance, one study found 
that if a comparable worth or similar standard were put into place across 
the country, the poverty rate for working women would see a 40 to 50% 
decline.228 
California and New York recognized the economic burden wage 
disparities place on their states, as evidenced by memoranda, committee 
notes, and justifications for their new pay equity statutes.229  The 
California state legislature noted that on average, women earned 84% of 
what men did in 2014, a few cents more than the national average of 
78%, and lost out on more than $33 billion every year.230  The legislature 
expressed concern about the wage gap’s “significant impact on the 
economic security and welfare of millions of working women and their 
families” and its contribution to “the higher statewide poverty rate 
among women.”231  In New York, the state legislature wrote that the 84% 
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disparity between men and women’s wages “prevent[s] maximum 
utilization of labor in the state economy.”232  The legislature noted that 
such differentials “put [individuals] at an economic disadvantage because 
of characteristics that bear no relationship to their job performance.”233 
These states are not alone in recognizing the economic potential in 
reducing or, eventually, eliminating the wage gap.  California, New 
York, and other countries with stricter pay equity standards—such as 
Canada, Sweden, and Hong Kong—have all used the same rationale for 
adopting tools to close the wage gap. 234  As the Associated Press 
reported, International Monetary Fund managing director Christine 
Lagarde has commented that “ensuring equal pay and economic 
opportunities for men and women boosts growth, promotes diversity, 
reduces economic inequality around the world and helps companies earn 
more.”235 
Critics of strengthened pay equity statutes argue that negative 
consequences of such laws outweigh the aforementioned economic 
gains.  They cite the costs of implementing pay equity programs, such as 
those associated with evaluating jobs to determine which positions have 
comparable worth and adjusting wages.236  They also critique 
interference with the private sector market as an undesirable 
consequence of enacting stronger pay equity laws.237  By increasing 
wages to achieve parity between the genders, critics argue, employers 
would attract a greater number of prospective employees but be forced to 
reduce the number of available positions because of higher salaries.238  
Further, critics note that the potential for more women entering the 
marketplace could also result in lower wages for men and women 
because of employers’ financial limitations.239 
However, a study published in 1994—about three decades after both 
the Equal Pay Act and Title VII were enacted—found that gradual 
introductions of pay equity changes “minimize potential negative 
effects.”240  Further, the study found “minimal”241 to no effects of 
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strengthened pay equity programs on depressed wages or declining 
employment in either the public or private sectors.242  To ensure Kansas 
does not take too drastic an approach to amending its pay equity statute, 
the state can gradually implement new provisions that the California, 
Massachusetts, and New York statutes model in three stages.  As the 
following section discusses, Kansas should begin strengthening its pay 
equity statute by shifting from an “equal work” standard to a 
“comparable work” standard, more closely defining employer affirmative 
defenses, and establishing protections for wage transparency. 
B. Advocating for a New Pay Equity Regime in Kansas 
To facilitate the economic benefit that closing the wage gap can 
provide, Kansas should prioritize changes to its pay equity statute.  An 
initial textual comparison between Kansas’s pay equity statute and 
California, New York, and Massachusetts’s statutes reveals an obvious 
gap between Kansas and those states deemed to be at the frontier of the 
trend toward broadening pay equity laws.  The Kansas statute’s “equal 
work” standard, its lack of detail in defining employers’ affirmative 
defenses to wage disparity claims, and its non-existent prohibition on 
wage discussion limit the law’s ability to adequately protect Kansas 
women and the state’s general economic interest.  Section 1 will discuss 
why Kansas should shift from an “equal work” standard to a 
“comparable work” standard.  Section 2 will explain which affirmative 
defenses should be more narrowly defined and the ideal language the 
legislature should incorporate into Kansas’s statute.  Finally, Section 3 
will outline the protections Kansas should establish to promote wage 
transparency. 
1. Shifting from “Equal Work” to “Comparable Work” 
Kansas should adopt a “comparable work” or “substantially similar 
work” standard analogous to the standards used in Massachusetts’s and 
California’s laws, respectively, because it allows for more uniform 
application and promotes economic growth.  Kansas’s current “equal pay 
for equal work” standard mirrors the Equal Pay Act’s “equal work” 
language,243 which Congress did not intend to be interchangeably 
interpreted with a “comparable work” standard.244 
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An “equal work” standard places a “difficult burden”245 on plaintiffs 
that, even if carried successfully, has led to varying case outcomes 
depending on the court.246  Federal courts interpreting the Equal Pay Act 
have either construed it strictly or “pragmatic[ally],”247 though most 
“have been reluctant to take a broad approach.”248  When courts apply 
the strict approach, they “often decline to find professional jobs as 
substantially equal”249 and do not “compare professional jobs unless the 
jobs are fungible or mirror images of each other.”250  The Seventh and 
Eighth Circuits, following the strict interpretation of “equal work,” also, 
unsurprisingly, have relatively low plaintiff success rates on claims 
brought under the Equal Pay Act.251 
Courts following the pragmatic approach, however, are afforded 
greater breadth of interpretation and see higher plaintiff success rates.  
These courts “focus on whether the core functions or general purpose of 
the job are substantially similar and then determine if the additional tasks 
are significant enough to establish the jobs as unequal.”252  The 
pragmatic approach “takes into account the regulatory definitions of 
equal skill, effort, and responsibility to establish whether the overall job 
function is the same.”253  One scholarly survey of plaintiff successes in 
federal circuit courts “most receptive” to claims brought under the Equal 
Pay Act, such as the District of Columbia Circuit and the Sixth Circuit, 
found rates to be as high as 75% and 85%, respectively.254  The Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the Equal Pay Act, handed down a decade after 
the statute’s implementation, seems to align more closely with case 
outcomes under the pragmatic approach.255  The Court held that the law’s 
purpose “is broadly remedial, and it should be construed and applied so 
as to fulfill the underlying purposes which Congress sought to 
achieve.”256 
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Kansas has sparse case law interpreting its pay equity statute; 
however, language from one state case indicates that the statute’s goal 
aligns closely with the pragmatic approach.  In Mulford v. Department of 
Human Resources, a 1990 decision, the plaintiff was a state employee 
who claimed that a “position-to-position study” comparing job 
responsibilities and wages was required to determine whether the Kansas 
Department of Human Resources and Department of Administration, 
Division of Personnel Services, inappropriately lowered his salary 
because of a job reclassification. 257  On appeal, plaintiff Verne Mulford 
challenged his salary decrease, arguing that such a change “must be 
based on substantial changes in the duties of [his] position” and that the 
department needed to compare his old and new positions.258  The court, 
discussing the governing Kansas statutes and Kansas Administrative 
Regulations, concluded that though the applicable law did not “use the 
phrase ‘equal pay for equal work,’” it did include a “goal of treating 
similar positions similarly.”259  This interpretation, though limited to 
administrative agency regulations, is analogous to the pragmatic 
approach federal courts have used when interpreting the Equal Pay Act. 
The pragmatic approach offers greater protections for prospective 
plaintiffs without sacrificing employers’ affirmative defenses.  The 
approach affords courts discretion to evaluate several factors such as 
tasks, responsibilities, required skills, effort, and functions to determine 
whether jobs are similar enough to allow comparison.260  It “allows for 
flexibility” without removing the protections of employers’ four 
affirmative defenses—seniority, merit, quality or quantity of production, 
and factors other than sex—that so many state statutes and federal 
statutes have codified.261  Language such as “comparable work” or 
“substantially similar work” eliminates the possibility of a strict 
interpretation—and its heavily negative consequences for prospective 
plaintiffs. 
Adoption of a single “comparable work” or “substantially similar 
work” standard in Kansas would also facilitate the economic benefits of 
closing the wage gap.  These standards would allow more women to 
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survive summary judgment and pursue claims with greater possibilities 
of success.  Because of the wider basis of comparison between jobs, 
plaintiffs will be afforded more opportunities to argue that their own jobs 
and the positions to which they are comparing their jobs are indeed 
substantially similar. 
Further, though a “comparable work” or “substantially similar work” 
standard is broader than the “equal work” language in Kansas’s current 
statute—and the Equal Pay Act—the former standard will also likely not 
bring about the negative consequences critics of strengthened pay equity 
laws fear.262  A significant number of federal courts are already 
interpreting the Equal Pay Act’s “equal work” language to mean 
“substantially similar work” and are considering several factors to make 
job comparisons with minimal or no negative impacts such as higher 
unemployment or lower wages for all workers because of increased labor 
costs.263  Uniform application of a “comparable work” or “substantially 
similar work” standard—which are analogous to the “pragmatic 
approach” of interpreting the “equal work” standard—would not require 
a total reversal of common law interpretations of “equal pay for equal 
work” in Kansas. 
2. Narrower Definition of “Factor Other than Sex” Affirmative Defense 
Though the affirmative defenses of seniority, merit, and quantity and 
quality of production codified in federal and many state pay equity 
statutes, including Kansas’s law,264 are relatively concrete,265 Kansas 
should clarify its fourth affirmative defense.  That defense, “a factor 
other than sex,” serves as a “catch-all defense” that has posed “the 
greatest problem for women pressing . . . [Equal Pay Act] claim[s].”266  
Because “a factor other than sex” has no further definition under the 
Equal Pay Act, Title VII,267 Kansas’s pay equity statute,268 or several 
other state statutes, “courts’ very general reading of [that affirmative 
defense] has reduced the effectiveness of the [Equal Pay Act].”269  
Without careful definition of what constitutes “a factor other than sex,” 
“[e]mployers only need to alter a job description along only one of the 
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four axes used for measuring value to make a ‘man’s job’ different from 
a similar ‘woman’s job.’”270 
Kansas should adopt more specific definitions to bolster the fourth 
affirmative defense under its pay equity statute.  The state should define 
“a factor other than sex” as “education, training, experience, or another 
factor that is reasonably job-related or furthers a legitimate business 
purpose.  This factor may not be based on or derived from employees’ 
sexes or cause a disparate impact based on sex.”  By enumerating job 
characteristics that employers must consider, plaintiffs can craft stronger 
claims and have a greater sense of predictability as their claims are 
adjudicated.  Further, even before they file claims, plaintiffs will have a 
clearer understanding of those job characteristics that can result in wage 
differentials—and those that cannot. 
The Paycheck Fairness Act and California, Massachusetts, and New 
York’s statutes all attempt to solve the Equal Pay Act’s definitional 
issues by enumerating specific factors employers can use as affirmative 
defenses under the “factor other than sex” umbrella.  The Paycheck 
Fairness Act only allows employers to use education, training, 
experience, and other factors that are “job-related with respect to the 
position in question” or further a “legitimate business purpose” as factors 
other than sex that account for wage differentials between genders.271  
California, Massachusetts, and New York’s pay equity statutes each 
model a portion of the Paycheck Fairness Act’s provisions: 
Massachusetts’s law allows employers to use “education, training or 
experience” as factors other than sex to explain wage differentials “to the 
extent such factors are reasonably related to the particular job in 
question.”272  California’s law echoes this language and does not allow 
employers’ affirmative defenses of factors other than sex to be “based on 
or derived from” employees’ sexes—those factors must be job-related 
and “consistent with a business necessity.”273  New York’s statute 
prohibits factors other than sex from being based on sex and also requires 
such factors to be “job-related” and “consistent with business 
necessit[ies].”274  New York’s law allows employees to rebut business 
necessity exceptions by showing three elements: (1) that the practice 
“causes a disparate impact on the basis of sex”; (2) that an alternative 
practice “would serve the same business purpose and not produce such 
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differential”; and (3) the employer refused to adopt the practice.275  
Kansas should draw from these state and federal examples to craft 
strengthened and specific language specifically defining “factors other 
than sex.” 
3. Protections for Wage Transparency and Wage Discussions 
Kansas should adopt language from California, Massachusetts, and 
New York’s statutes as well as key language from the Lilly Ledbetter 
Fair Pay Act to more effectively provide notice to employees about 
potential wage disparities and subsequent pay equity claims.  By 
codifying prohibitions against employer restrictions on wage discussions 
and the Fair Pay Act’s expanded statute of limitations for pay equity 
claims, employees will not be denied judicial recourse simply because 
they had no notice of subtle or silent discriminatory wage practices. 
Simultaneously incorporating statutory provisions that protect both 
employers and employees will allow Kansas to balance interests.  The 
state should specifically add language, as Massachusetts has done, 
protecting employees filing complaints, voicing opposition to 
discriminatory practices, testifying about wage disparity investigations, 
and discussing wages from employers’ retaliation.276  However, as New 
York has done, Kansas should also allow employers to place reasonable 
limits on employee wage discussions and create an affirmative defense 
against wage discrimination claims if employees violate such appropriate 
limits.277  Such amendments would limit practical and logistical concerns 
of having no workplace guidelines governing wage discussions.  
However, they would also leave in place a fundamentally important 
catalyst for employees to hold employers accountable for compensation 
decisions and practices. 
Wage transparency is a cornerstone of plaintiffs’ wage 
discrimination claims.  Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Ledbetter v. 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. highlighted the importance of wage 
transparency in providing employees notice that they may have viable 
pay equity claims.278  Such transparency depends on employees’ abilities 
to discuss their wages with one another and with their employers without 
fearing retaliation.279  Transparency also bolsters employees’ abilities to 
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file timely claims, which the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act helped to 
facilitate by changing the point at which the statute of limitations for 
Title VII claims begins to toll.280  The tolling period can begin when a 
“discriminatory compensation decision or . . . practice is adopted,” 
“when an individual becomes subject” to such a decision or practice, or 
when that individual “is affected by application” of such a decision or 
practice.281  This law redefined and expanded statutes of limitation to 
allow older pay equity claims, or claims that have accumulated over 
time, to be viable, as Justice Ginsburg identified in her dissent.282 
The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act and laws enacted in California, 
Massachusetts, and New York work to improve wage transparency and 
give employees notice that potential pay equity claims exist.  California, 
Massachusetts, and New York’s pay equity statutes all prohibit 
employers from placing restrictions on employees’ discussions of 
wages.283  These conversations facilitate notice that employees might be 
experiencing wage discrepancies and could start the tolling of one of the 
three statutes of limitations outlined in the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act if 
those provisions were adopted, which Massachusetts has done.284 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Kansas’s pay equity statute does little to protect the state’s workers 
and economy.  Federal law and proposed legislation as well as 
California, New York, and Massachusetts’s more robust pay equity laws 
provide templates for Kansas to follow.  Data and scholarly analyses of 
the impact existing pay equity laws have had over the past five decades 
demonstrate the need for continued strides toward closing the wage gap.  
The economic benefits of pay equity support the proposition that, more 
than fifty years after the enactment of the Equal Pay Act, pay equity 
remedies should be made more accessible to Kansas workers through 
statutory means. 
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